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1 2 or candidate in a given election. Firms buy access to potential winners even when they do not share their policy preferences. 5 The characterization of money directly buying policies, besides being unrealistic, harbors dire implications for industry lobby formation by firms with common interests. Olson's (1965) classic lobbying model, which links policy outcomes directly to financial contributions, yields the finding that -no one in the group will have an incentive independently to provide any of the collective good once the amount that would be purchased by the individual in the group with the largest F i was available‖ (p.28), where F i stands for the ith individual's fraction of total benefits.
Hence, at most one firm has an incentive to contribute in return for a policy that benefits all of an industry's firms. This conclusion, therefore, raises serious questions about the logical consistency of the lobbying literature's standard pairing of the assumptions that all of an industry's firms lobby and that policies are adopted in return for monetary contributions. 6 A small, but growing literature has addressed the issue of endogenous lobby formation when monetary contributions directly affect policies. Pecorino (1998) employs a repeated game framework with a trigger strategy to show that all of an industry's firms of equal size might have an incentive to lobby. Pecorino's framework was later adopted by Magee (2002) who endogenized both lobby formation and policy choices. Mitra (1999) , on the other hand, established lobby formation without a repeated game by assuming that firms engage in preplay communication. His model also assumes that industries are made up of identical firms and that money is the lobbying instrument. The assumption of identical firms was finally relaxed by Bombardini (2004) . Based on the menu-auction approach of Grossman and Helpman (1994) , she lets each of the industry's heterogeneous firms decide on whether to enter the lobbying game and what individual contribution schedule to present to its government. Hillman (1991) , in a little-known but truly important paper, discards the assumption of lobbying through monetary contributions. Lobbying by his firms requires that managers spend costly time to influence policy makers. Hillman demonstrates that more than one of many heterogeneous firms might lobby. In fact, all of an industry's firms will participate, even if they are of different size, provided all firm managers possess the same entrepreneurial ability.
Monetary contributions play no role in Hillman's model.
Hillman's insights emerge from a lobbying-by-firms model that corresponds to the classic private-provision-of-public-goods model of Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) .
Consequently, the implications from Hillman's model are equally strong. First, all CEOs of lobbying firms spend the same amount of time on entrepreneurial activities even if they differ with respect to entrepreneurial abilities. Different abilities show up as differences in lobbying activities only. When all CEOs possess the same entrepreneurial talent, then all of them lobby if one has an incentive to do so, and all spend the same amount of time on lobbying. Second, there emerges a neutrality relationship between total industry lobbying and the degree of concentration of the lobbying industry: for a given number of lobbying firms, total industry lobbying depends only on the group's total profit and not on the distribution of total profit among its members, irrespective of whether the CEOs have equal or unequal entrepreneurial abilities (pg. 132). In other words, if profit serves as a proxy for size, the group's lobbying effort depends on the group's aggregate size but is independent of the contributing firms' size distribution.
Hillman's conclusion on the independence of industry lobbying from the industry's firmsize distribution is not supported by empirical evidence. Gawande (1997) finds a positive and (statistically) highly significant (at the 1% level) relationship between an industry's degree of concentration and its lobbying-contribution level. The underlying reason for why, say, a high degree of concentration yields a large contribution level is that -the same barriers to entry that allow a high degree of concentration also allow firms to reap the full benefits from lobbying‖ and hence as a group they contribute more.
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Our alternative lobbying formulation assumes that it takes both money and time to lobby effectively. Lobbying a legislator first involves the making of a financial contribution by the firm to gain access to the legislator. The larger the contribution, the greater is the amount of ‗access-7 Some studies find no effect and some a negative effect between the industry's degree of concentration and its ‗policy-effectiveness' (see, Potters and Sloof, 1996, pg. 417) . The inference one might draw, here, is that in the former case the degree of concentration does not affect the industry's contribution-level and in the latter case, the greater (smaller) the degree of concentration, the smaller (larger) the industry's contribution-level. This stands in contrast to Gawande's finding. Now, one shortcoming of these studies is that they do not explicitly examine how concentration affects the level of contribution, but how concentration affects the ‗policy-effectiveness' variable. Another, more serious shortcoming lies on the methodological front; while the ‗policy-effectiveness' variable is treated as a function of the industry's contribution level, the contribution-level, itself, is considered to be independent of the ‗policy-effectiveness' variable. So, e.g., where the policy-effectiveness variable is the level of protection, the protection-level is considered to be a function of the industry's contribution-level but not vice-versa. Now, Gawande, drawing on Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) , maintains that the contribution-level, itself, is a function of the level of protection enjoyed by the industry; a higher level of protection makes for higher industry profit (all else equal) which, in turn, allows for a greater level of contribution (in pursuit of an even higher level of protection that will yield an even larger profit) -a kind of ‗wealth effect'. It can thus be concluded that these studies, by failing to account for the dependence of the industry's contribution-level on the ‗policy-effectiveness' variable, render their results tainted by the ‗simultaneity-bias' problem allowing us to place little confidence in them. Once a firm gains access, it can utilize this access to inform and influence the legislator.
Preparing for and meeting with legislators, however, requires time on the part of the firm's manager(s). Hence, the firm must reallocate resources away from production and towards accessutilization. Here, we make the narrow assumption that lobbying is done by the firm's CEO rather than some lower-level delegate(s). 9 One might also argue that lobbying is often done by hired professionals rather than the firm's CEO. But even in this case, the CEO must spend much time preparing the firm's policy position and conveying it to the hired lobbyists. Consequently, the above-described reallocation is still present. In so much as lobbying uses up ‗entrepreneurial time', we draw on Hillman (1991) Based on this ‗money-buys-access' and ‗access-requires-time' specification, we first examine individual firms' incentives to lobby. Larger firms have stronger incentives than smaller firms and, in equilibrium, all, some, or none of an industry's firms might end up lobbying.
Second, we examine the effect of a law that imposes a contribution limit on firms. We conclude that lobbying firms not affected by the limit and previously non-lobbying firms have an incentive to step up their lobbying. In fact, it is quite likely that the number of lobbying firms rises in response to contribution limits.
When we examine the influence of an industry's firm-size distribution on its lobbying effort, a mean-preserving, more unequal size distribution of firms is shown to result in a lower 8 Holt and Wallace (2001) of the Center for Public Integrity, for example, report, that there exist different price tags for joining the Republican Attorneys General Association which pushed for -nonparticipation by Republican attorneys general in lawsuits against corporations' interests.‖ $25,000 provided -preferred seating‖ at events, offering private conversations; $15,000 secured tickets to events and access to conference calls; while $5,000-10,000 offered less access.
9 USA Today, in a report on the lobbying of Net firms writes that -Most of the lobbying is done by the companies' CEOs, who fly to Washington periodically to visit lawmakers. ‖ Schwab (1994) , in her detailed examination of the making of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, notes concerning the plant lobbying effort by the entire industry. And when we evaluate an entire industry's lobbying reaction to an exogenous price change, we find that a decline in the world price raises the industry's total lobbying. This is in keeping with the real-world observation of the U.S. steel industry revving-up its lobbying effort following a decline in world steel prices in the late 1990s (see Griswold (1999) ). It is worth noting here that the increase in the industry's lobbying effort is carried by the largest firms who definitely expand their lobbying. Smaller firms, on the other hand, might lower and possibly even discontinue their lobbying in response to a price decline.
Finally, we explore the relationship between an industry's lobbying and its firms' ease of adjusting inputs. We find an industry's lobbying response to be weaker the more easily it adjusts its non-managerial inputs such as labor. Our model thus uncovers a (testable) link between labor laws that impinge on firms' labor-adjustment ability 10 and the industry's lobbying effort. Labormarket reform measures that enhance this adjustment-ability not only improve labor-market efficiency but also deliver the ‗benefit' of tightening the reins on lobbying.
The Model
Consider an industry with N firms in a small, open economy. All firms produce the same homogeneous good X and have the same production function. They may, however, differ in size.
The production function has the form: 
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The sub-production function
is homogeneous of degree one in labor and capital, and it has positive, decreasing marginal products. It can be restated as:
closing provision that -it was primarily a small hard core group of individual firms and the administration that did the most lobbying against the provision -(p.170). 10 One such law would be a ban on the hiring of certain types of individuals; for instance, children below a certain age. 11 When we examine the relationship between total lobbying of an industry and the size-distribution of its firms, we add the assumption that 0 (.)     g , as would be the case when We now order the industry's N firms from the largest to the smallest by assigning subscripts such that:
Concerning the employment of labor, initially we assume that it is already in place and cannot be adjusted when the lobbying decision is made. Later, when we analyze the industry's lobbying response to an exogenous price change, this assumption is relaxed.
It is a firm's CEO who provides the management input.
12 Each CEO possesses one unit of time that is to be allocated between the tasks of managing the firm and lobbying the legislator. This is represented by: 
The purpose of gaining access is to lobby the legislator for raising the domestic price of good X , denoted by P , above the exogenously given world price,  . The domestic price function is: g term in equation (1) would be unaffected by lobbying,
, whereas equation (5) would hold as written. This would cast our model into the Olson mold. If, on the other hand, no monetary contribution was required to gain lobbying-access, but there is a trade-off between lobbying and managing, we would have
This would cast our model into the Hillman mold.
The respective roles of time and money in shaping a firm's lobbying incentives will become more apparent in the following section.
The Firm's Lobbying Decision
This section examines a firm's incentive to lobby under the assumption that its employment of labor cannot be adjusted at the time of the lobbying decision. We implicitly assume that all employment decisions were made in the past, before any lobbying was contemplated. At that time, firms faced the same wage rate, w , and world price,  , and CEOs spent their entire time on the task of management. Consequently, each firm, no matter its size ( j K ), chose the same labor-capital ratio (  ).
The th j firm's profit function is given by: lobby -such that optimal lobbying,
The relationship between monetary contributions and price as summarized by (5) and (6), represents a reduced form of a more elaborate model on the information exchange between CEOs and legislators. A legislator, to maximize political support, requires both money to run campaigns and information to assess the impact of proposed policies. The CEO, in turn, knows that the firm (and she) can benefit from delivering information as she can bias its content. Now, we do not explicitly model this information exchange. What our model, however, does make explicit is that time is needed to transmit information and that more time offers more opportunities to convey information that benefits the firm (and the CEO). 
Given the largest firm's lobbying choice, any other firm with capital stock 1 K K j  has an incentive to lobby as well if criterion (8) also holds for j  1; that is, if:
To evaluate (8'), compare it with (9), after noting that
. Clearly, the LHS of (8') always exceeds the LHS of (9). The RHS of (8'), on the other hand, is larger than (equal to) the RHS of (9) 
is total lobbying time spent by the H largest firms (where
The second part of Proposition 2 states that, in equilibrium, each of the M equal-sized firms lobbies, if the representative firm has an incentive to lobby when no other firm lobbies. This follows from a comparison of (9) with (8') when
We have demonstrated that the number of endogenously determined lobbying firms can be one, some, all or none. In what follows, we examine the forces behind this finding by relating our model to the specifications of Olson and Hillman. Olson's (1965) model rests on the assumption that lobbying consists of making monetary contributions for directly purchasing policies. Since lobbying has no impact on a CEO's management input, this implies in the context of our model that
. This, in turn, implies that equations (9) and (8') -constituting the conditions for more than one firm to lobby -reduce then it also must be that
Hence, in equilibrium, all N firms have an incentive to lobby and, in equilibrium, 15 This bias is the consequence of lobbying being an increasing-cost activity when, as assumed, managing raises output at a decreasing rate. 15 Hillman allows entrepreneurial ability to vary among firms. How heterogeneity in management abilities affects the number of lobbying firms depends on the way heterogeneity is introduced. If, for example, 
Lobbying Equilibrium
An industry lobbying equilibrium is established when none of the M already lobbying firms has an incentive to adjust their lobbying and none of the ) ( M N  non-lobbying firms has an incentive to start lobbying. Hence, in a non-cooperative lobbying equilibrium: (12) are best-lobbying-response functions of the lobbying firms. A sufficient condition for the equilibrium to be unique is that the best-response functions' slopes are less than one in absolute value for all firms (Eichberger, 1993, p.105) . Differentiating (12) 
Clearly, the absolute value of the slope of the response function is less than one for all m and j .
We next consider the influence of a firm's size on its lobbying. Looking at (12), note that the equilibrium value of 
Contribution Limits and Lobbying Incentives
Suppose an upper limit of 0  C is imposed on how much money a firm can contribute to legislators' election campaigns (or more generally, for lobbying purposes). This, in turn, implies an upper limit (of, say, 0  A ) on how much access-time an individual firm can acquire.
Concerning such a lobbying constraint, we establish:
Proposition 4: The imposition of a lobbying constraint that is binding on some but not all lobbying firms:
a. Definitely raises lobbying by firms on whom the constraint is not binding;.
b. Possibly increases the number of lobbying firms, as it heightens the incentives of non-lobbying firms to join the lobby.
With N M  lobbying firms and no lobbying constraints, equations (12) 
, so far non-lobbying firms have stronger incentives to lobby. It, therefore, is quite possible that for the largest of the ) ( M N  pre-constraint non-lobbying firms, we have:
Size Distribution of Firms and Industry Lobbying
Concerning the relationship between the size-distribution of firms and the industry's lobbying effort, we state: , the equality of (12) turns into the inequality of (12') for firms with binding constraints; and it turns into the inequality of (12‖) for firms with no binding constraint when lobbying of the firm under consideration is evaluated at the original lobbying equilibrium. 17 For further explanations, see Laffont (1993) (17) shows the lobbying response of each of the other firms, and equation (18) 
M is given and 
in the first bracket of the RHS of (19). And since the expression of the second bracket on the RHS in (19) is always positive, a more unequal size distribution of firms reduces the industry's overall lobbying effort.
The intuition underlying the above finding, focusing on the role of access cost -since this is the key feature that distinguishes our setting from that of Hillman, runs as follows. For the contracting firm j , the percentage increase in the price of access per unit of capital is much greater than the percentage decrease in the price of access per unit of capital experienced by the expanding firm i . This leads firm j to cut its lobbying time by more than the corresponding lobbying expansion by firm i , resulting in a fall in the total lobbying time of the industry. In Hillman's setting, since access is costless (although time spent lobbying is not), firm j does not undertake as sharp of a cut in its lobbying time. In fact, in Hillman, the cut in lobbying time by firm j matches the expansion in lobbying time by firm i , leaving total industry lobbying unchanged.
Finally, if the more unequal size-distribution of firms is associated with less industry lobbying for a given number of M firms, there now emerge added incentives for so-far nonlobbying firms to become active lobbyists under the more unequal distribution. Hence, an industry with a more unequal-size distribution of firms might have more lobbying firms but lobby less in total than an industry with a more equal-size distribution of firms.
Firm and Industry Lobbying Responses to an Exogenous Price Change
Firms can adjust their profits either through lobbying for a higher price or through producing more. When managerial resources are required for both lobbying and producing, there exists a trade-off between the alternative ways of influencing profits. A CEO's optimal allocation of management time between lobbying and managing is, therefore, critically affected by any exogenous change, such as a change in the world price of the good produced by the firm.
Concerning the impact of a change in the world price, ,on individual firms' and the entire industry's lobbying, we obtain: To highlight the different influences on a firm's lobbying response, we substitute the domestic price function of (6) in the firm's first-order condition of (12) and differentiate it with respect to π, yielding: We started the evaluation of lobbying responses under the assumption that the number of actively lobbying firms remains M . As should be apparent from the above discussion, the number of lobbying firms is endogenously determined. It could decrease, increase, or remain constant. As mentioned, it is quite conceivable that for the smallest of all lobbying firms, the first component of the RHS numerator of (20) is overpowered by the second component and the firm stops lobbying in response to the world price decline. But, as (21) indicates, this can happen only if industry lobbying rises substantially. If, on the other hand, the first component on the RHS numerator of (21) is larger than the second component, then such a firm definitely raises rather than discontinues its own lobbying.
Lobbying Responses to Price Changes when Labor Employment is Variable.
The preceding section established a negative relationship between the world price, , and total industry lobbying. We obtained this result under the assumption that, at the time of the lobbying decision, each firm's capital stock, as well as its labor employment is given. We now relax this assumption and permit each firm to adjust the use of labor when it lobbies. Our objective is to examine how the industry's lobbying is affected by its firms' ability to adjust employment. To highlight the influence of flexible labor employment, we make the simplifying assumption of an industry with equal-sized firms and establish: 
. We assume this to be the case and denote industry lobbying by A , such that each firm's lobbying is
The firm's profit-maximizing choice of labor is obtained by maximizing (7) with respect to K L   , yielding the first-order condition:
, the optimal labor-capital employment ratio is positively related to both the world price,  , and the industry's total lobbying, A . Each firm's lobbying choice, in turn, results in a non-cooperative equilibrium if:
Given the above equilibrium conditions, we now change the world price π.
18 Differentiating (23) and (24) with respect to  yields:
at the optimal choice.
Hence, the influence of adjustable labor employment is such that it always counteracts the lobbying effort. In fact, it possibly counteracts so strongly that it leads to a reversal in the direction of the lobbying response. In all situations, the firm's ability to adjust its employment acts as a substitute for its ability to lobby.
Concluding Remarks
This paper formulated a lobbying-by-firms model that highlights the influence of monetary contributions to buy access to politicians and of management time to make use of this access.
This merging of Olson's assumption that money buys policies and Hillman's assumption that lobbying competes with management time yields a more realistic modeling of the actual lobbying process than can be found in the current literature. Equally important, the model's implications offer useful hypotheses about major forces that influence an industry's lobbying effort: the size of individual firms, the size distribution of firms, the existence of a legal restriction on a firm's lobbying contribution, the world price of the industry's output, and the firms' ability to adjust inputs in response to world price changes.
The most disturbing implication of Olson's ‗money-buys-policies' assumption is that the inherent free-rider problem is so severe that it becomes very difficult to explain why many or all of an industry's firms engage in lobbying. This difficulty is most pronounced when firms are of different size. The characterization of lobbying as a repeated game by Pecorino (1998) , as a oneshot game with pre-play communication by Mitra (1999) , and as a common-agency game by Bombardini (2004) offer potential resolutions to this logical inconsistency inherent in the usual pairing of the money-buys-policies and all-firms-lobby assumptions. Pecorino's repeated game and Mitra's pre-play communications models restore logical consistency of these assumptions under the restriction that all firms of an industry are of the same size. Bombardini's common agency model is, to our knowledge, the only successful attempt to establish logical consistency between the money-buys-policies and many-firms-lobby assumptions when firms are allowed to be of different size. The model of our paper represents what we believe to be a more realistic, alternative approach to explaining how some or all of an industry's firms use money to influence the lobbying process. By adding Hillman's feature of a trade-off between lobbying and managing to the traditional feature that money matters we can show that some, all, or none of an industry's firms have an incentive to lobby. And by assuming that money buys access to politicians, the use of money conforms to the campaign contribution laws of the United States and many other countries far better than by assuming that money buys policies.
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Our model yields two kinds of insights. The first kind concerns the impact of different external forces on the lobbying effort of individual firms. It is shown that an increase in a firm's size raises its incentives to lobby. A legal restriction on how much a firm can contribute, of course, reduces lobbying by firms on whom the constraint is binding; but it raises the lobbying efforts of already lobbying firms that are not restricted by the constraint and they create lobbying incentives for firms that, so far, did not lobby. That a contribution-limit may, in fact, expand the ‗policy-making' influence of some firms ought to goad campaign-finance reformers into undertaking a more rigorous examination of this ‗limits-issue'. Finally, a rise in the world price of the industry's good definitely leads to a smaller lobbying effort by the largest firms; but it might raise lobbying by the smallest firms.
Secondly, we gain insights with respect to the impact of different external forces on the lobbying effort of the entire industry. This effect is, of course, relevant for explaining the endogenous formation of economic policies. We demonstrate that an industry's total lobbying is sensitive to the size distribution of firms. Under certain restrictions on the firm's production function, a more unequal size distribution of firms is shown to lead to a decline in industry lobbying. A legal restriction on the political contribution of individual firms results in a decline in industry lobbying even though individual firms might lobby more than before; the cutback in lobbying by firms directly affected by the constraint is never completely made up by the increased lobbying of firms not directly affected by the constraint. Lastly, when firms lack the ability to adjust factor-inputs, such as labor, a fall (rise) in the world price leads to an expansion (contraction) in the industry's lobbying effort. The ability to adjust factor-inputs, now, mutes the industry's lobbying response. This can be a ‗blessing' or a ‗curse'. In the case of industries confronting declining (rising) world prices, a greater ease of adjustment may even shrink (enlarge) their respective lobbying efforts and prove to be a ‗blessing' (‗curse'). Whether, in fact, the ease of adjustment bears this two-faced nature is left to future work to uncover. 
